Introduction
Recent developments in patenting activity are the subject of a growing literature. Existing research contributes to a better understanding of the incentives that drive economic agents to rely on the patent system (e.g. Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001; Blind et al., 2006; Peeters and van Pottelsberghe, 2006; von Graevenitz et al., 2013) and on potential implications of their behaviour for the effectiveness of the patent system. Lately, a number of researchers have started to explore the design of the patent system itself, i.e. the role of fees and costs of patenting (Archontopoulos et al., 2007; Harhoff et al., 2009; de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2013) , the duration of examination (Thomas, 2010; Harhoff, 2011) , as well as patent office governance and management (Friebel et al., 2006) . 4 Whereas the first two changes aimed at reducing the burden of costs for the applicants of European (EP) patents, the latter change aimed at increasing patenting costs to reduce the complexity of applications. Even though many practitioners have argued that patent office fees account for only a small fraction of total patenting costs, they often represent marginal costs while attorney fees -which are assumed to make up for the major part of patenting costs -are largely sunk ex ante. First empirical evidence points to a considerable impact of fees. Archontopoulos et al. (2007) , for instance, find that after an increase of the claim fee in the US in 2004, 5 the average number of claims per patent decreased from 28 to 23. De Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2012) summarize evidence from empirical studies indicating inelastic, though not small, reactions to fee changes ranging from −0.03 to −0.60.
With the exception of early work by Pakes (1986) and Schankerman and Pakes (1986) and empirical analyses by Lanjouw (1998) who analyse the impact of post-grant renewal fees and litigation costs, existing research has focused on pre-grant fees and costs. The objective of this chapter is to provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of post-grant costs and fees, i.e. translation costs and fees for validating an EP patent in different jurisdictions as well as for keeping it in force. The European patent system provides an excellent setting for understanding the drivers of international patenting strategies, since it imposes rather heterogeneous cost regimes on patent applicants. Once a patent is granted by the EPO, the applicant has the option, but not the obligation, to validate the patent in any of the countries for which patent protection was requested. At this point, the patent may have to be translated into a different language. Hence, these costs are marginal in the sense that at the point of decision-making all examination and application fees are sunk, the grant decision has been made, and the receipt of the national patent only depends on the costs considered here.
Translations into Nordic languages or Greek are, for instance, particularly expensive. First, because these languages are rare, i.e. the number of native speakers is small. Second, for Greek, since the distance between this language and English, German or French is particularly large, this increases the translations costs. Hence, linguistic distances may affect patenting decisions. More specifically, patents may not be validated in some countries due to high costs associated with a translation.
We provide estimates of the impact of post-grant fees and costs on patenting using a model of validation decisions as a function of translation costs and fees for validating and maintaining the patent. In the following, an empirical model of validation behaviour is tested with a unique dataset that includes all
